CFM Will Look At Changes Following Parts-Sales Scandal

CFM56
Credit: Sean Broderick / AWST

CFM International and co-owners GE Aerospace and Safran plan to explore both internal and industry-wide steps to help reduce the chances that parts with fake or improper paperwork are accepted by airlines and repair stations.

Specifics on any potential changes, prompted by UK broker AOG Technics’ forging of paperwork allegedly produced by the companies and shipped with parts, would take time to develop, a CFM spokesperson cautioned. But one of the ramifications of the AOG scandal is an examination of both internal and external processes for possible gaps that could be filled without disrupting long-established industry processes, the company confirmed.

CFM said that it has reviewed all documentation turned over by AOG Technics following a UK court order issued in early October.

Findings so far include 180 falsified airworthiness approval documents—most of them European Union Aviation Safety Agency Form 1s. The fake approvals covered 124 part numbers and thousands of parts.

Most of the parts are non-serialized material, such as bolts and washers. Among the serialized parts sold with fake paperwork are turbine blades and vanes. No life-limited parts have been flagged in the ongoing probe.

The un-airworthy, AOG-provided parts, many of them secondhand but passed off as new, were installed on at least 145 engines—most of them CFM56-series power plants. CFM said more than half have been removed from service so the questionable parts can be swapped out.

“CFM has completed an exhaustive review of the documentation provided by AOG Technics and shared the results with the relevant authorities,” the company said. “We are closely working with CFM56 operators affected by unauthorized parts from AOG Technics while supporting the investigation to keep unapproved parts out of the global supply chain.”

The probe, launched when CFM became aware of the London-based broker’s activities in June, still has several key questions to answer. Among them: Where did the AOG principals get the parts they sold, and were any of them eligible for installation?

EASA and other regulators have issued unapproved parts notices flagging AOG Technics’ activities, which became public in July. But CFM and its partners have taken the de facto lead in pushing to identify questionable parts in the supply chain by forcing AOG Technics’ hand in court.

The engine-maker may find that an industry-wide effort meets resistance from other stakeholders.

At the recent Aviation Week MRO Europe event, several executives said the AOG Technics problem should be blamed on criminal activity rather than flaws in industry’s processes.

“The processes, I believe are robust,” said Iván González Vallejo, Iberia Maintenance’s director supply chain and MRO Strategy. “Maybe some more controls or technology could have helped. But if you want to forge paper, you can forge it, as well as a digital certificate.”

British Airways Chief Technology Officer Andy Best suggested the current mix of airline cost scrutiny, high demand for narrowbody lift, and supply-chain challenges creates an attractive scenario for profiting from attractively priced parts. Opportunity triggers ingenuity, among legitimate companies and criminals.

“I don’t think we should be blaming the airlines per se, or the [manufacturers],” he said. “We should be blaming the person that did it. That’s where it starts.”

Sean Broderick

Senior Air Transport & Safety Editor Sean Broderick covers aviation safety, MRO, and the airline business from Aviation Week Network's Washington, D.C. office.

Comments

1 Comment
This comment from BA says it all: "the current mix of airline cost scrutiny, high demand for narrowbody lift, and supply-chain challenges creates an attractive scenario for profiting from attractively priced parts." In my experience, a new low-cost source of parts is often a source of SUP parts. This especially true when the availability of new parts is low, and the purchase price is very different from current sources. The corrective action is to improve source approval procedures and receiving inspection. Trusting your Receiving Inspectors is very important. Used parts, presented as new, will always have a significant variation in dimensional characteristics not found in new production parts. I agree the people selling SUP parts are to blame, but organizations have the tools necessary to detect SUPs Only if they fund them consistently even during lean times.